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The last number I heard was that we have 100 years of known oil reserves. So assuming we don't find any more oil, which is a stupid assumption, we'll run out in 100 years. I hope that, given the advances in technology over the last century, we'll have some fairly impressive new alternative energy sources 100 years from now.

 
I'm all for new technologies like hydrogen, nuclear, and what-not, but this waste of money on stupid sh1t like wind and hybrids are ridiculous. Hybrids pollute in a completely different way and wind is so completely inefficient and cost stupid. Nuke, hydrogen, solar (for hydrogen production).

 
The wikipedia page on "peak oil" makes for interesting reading. All points of view are considered.

Predictions of the timing of peak oil include the possibilities that it has recently occurred, that it will occur shortly, or that a plateau of oil production will sustain supply for up to 100 years. None of these predictions dispute the peaking of oil production, but disagree only on when it will occur.

"All the easy oil and gas in the world has pretty much been found. Now comes the harder work in finding and producing oil from more challenging environments and work areas. ” — William J. Cummings, Exxon-Mobil company spokesman, December 2005

It is pretty clear that there is not much chance of finding any significant quantity of new cheap oil. Any new or unconventional oil is going to be expensive. ” — Lord Ron Oxburgh, a former chairman of Shell, October 2008

 
Some good info in this AP article on the possible negligent actions of BP leading up to the blowout:

BP engineer called doomed rig a 'nightmare well'
By MATTHEW DALY, Associated Press Writer Matthew Daly, Associated Press Writer – Mon Jun 14, 6:17 pm ET

WASHINGTON – BP took measures to cut costs in the weeks before the catastrophic blowout in the Gulf of Mexico as it dealt with one problem after another, prompting a BP engineer to describe the doomed rig as a "nightmare well," according to internal documents released Monday.

The comment by BP engineer Brian Morel came in an e-mail April 14, six days before the Deepwater Horizon rig explosion that killed 11 people and has sent tens of millions of gallons of oil into the Gulf in the nation's worst environmental disaster.

The e-mail was among dozens of internal documents released by the House Energy and Commerce Committee, which is investigating the explosion and its aftermath.

In a letter to BP CEO Tony Hayward, Reps. Henry Waxman, D-Calif., and Bart Stupak, D-Mich., noted at least five questionable decisions BP made in the days leading up to the explosion.

"The common feature of these five decisions is that they posed a trade-off between cost and well safety," said Waxman and Stupak. Waxman chairs the energy panel while Stupak heads a subcommittee on oversight and investigations.

"Time after time, it appears that BP made decisions that increased the risk of a blowout to save the company time or expense," the lawmakers wrote in the 14-page letter to Hayward. "If this is what happened, BP's carelessness and complacency have inflicted a heavy toll on the Gulf, its inhabitants, and the workers on the rig."

The letter, supplemented by 61 footnotes and dozens of documents, outlines a series of questions Hayward can expect when he comes before Stupak's subcommittee on Thursday.

The hearing will be Hayward's first appearance before a congressional committee since the explosion and sinking of the BP-operated Deepwater Horizon rig. BP America President Lamar McKay and other officials represented the company at earlier hearings.

The letter by Waxman and Stupak focuses on details such as how to secure the final section of the deepwater well. The company apparently chose a riskier option among two possibilities — running a single string of steel casing from the seafloor to the bottom of the well, instead of hanging a steel liner with a "tieback" on top.

Despite warnings from its own engineers, "BP chose the more risky casing option, apparently because the liner option would have cost $7 to $10 million more and taken longer," Waxman and Stupak said.

In a brief e-mail exchange, Morel and a colleague, Richard Miller, talked about the last-minute changes.

"We could be running it in 2-3 days, so need a relative quick response. Sorry for the late notice, this has been nightmare well which has everyone all over the place," Morel wrote on April 14.

Waxman and Stupak also said BP apparently rejected advice of a subcontractor, Halliburton Inc., in preparing for a cementing job to close up the well. BP rejected Halliburton's recommendation to use 21 "centralizers" to make sure the casing ran down the center of the well bore, they said. Instead, BP used six centralizers.

In an e-mail on April 16, a BP official involved in the decision explained: "It will take 10 hours to install them. I do not like this." Later that day, another official recognized the risks of proceeding with insufficient centralizers but commented: "who cares, it's done, end of story, will probably be fine."

In spite of the well's difficulties, "BP appears to have made multiple decisions for economic reasons that increased the danger of a catastrophic well failure," Waxman and Stupak said.

The lawmakers also said BP also decided against a nine- to 12-hour procedure known as a "cement bond log" that would have tested the integrity of the cement. A team from Schlumberger, an oil services firm, was on board the rig, but BP sent the team home on a regularly scheduled helicopter flight the morning of April 20. Less than 12 hours later, the rig exploded. [NOTE: THIS WAS DLEG'S OLD JOB AND EMPLOYER!]

BP also failed to fully circulate drilling mud, a 12-hour procedure that could have helped detect gas pockets that later shot up the well and exploded on the drilling rig.

A spokesman for BP could not immediately reached for comment.
These mostly seem pretty seriously bad decisions to me. The whole "nightmare well" quote is obviously overblown.

Here is some damning evidence against BP: an argument between the rig superintendant, Jimmy Harrell, and the BP "company man" just prior to the cement job, when BP rejected the "common practice" cement job practices, like running adequate centralizers on the casing string:

Testifying before the Coast Guard and MMS panel last month, Douglas Brown, the chief mechanic on the Deepwater Horizon, said that on the morning of the day that the rig exploded Harrell had a "skirmish" over drilling procedures during a meeting with BP's "company man," well site leader Robert Kaluza. "I remember the company man saying this is how it's going to be," Brown told the panel. As Harrell was leaving the meeting, according to Brown, "He pretty much grumbled, 'I guess that's what we have those pincers for,'" referring to the blowout preventer on the sea floor that is supposed to be the last resort to prevent a leak in the event of an emergency. The blowout preventer failed following the explosion on the rig, causing the massive spill.
Later that day, in the midst of the blowout and fire, a satellite phone call between Harrell and "someone" was overheard by as many as three other individuals on a nearby support vessel:

...according to this witness account, Harrell was screaming, "Are you fucking happy? Are you fucking happy? The rig's on fire! I told you this was gonna happen."
Whoever was on the other end of the line was apparently trying to calm Harrell down. "I am fucking calm," he went on, according to Buzbee. "You realize the rig is burning?"

 
This is also an exceptionally informative series of diagrams, illustrating the failed "top kill" method. Shows the damage to the BOP.

Top Kill Diagram

 
And if you're interested in what's happening now, a good diagram of the "top hat" being used to collect the oil.

Top Hat

 
definitely some great info here,

heard a story from a guy who bought a rental property in Panama City, gutted it fixed it up and had it rented at $2200 per week for pretty much the entire summer. all of his renters backed out after July 4th and now he can't even fetch $1200 per week. Sad he can't afford the place w/o the income.

 
An excellent, in depth look into how the BOP works, and potential reasons why it failed in this NY Times article.

(I'm impressed with the NYT guys, far better reporting than I've seen from any of the other news sources, which have either sensationalized it or gotten the details laughably wrong. Or both...)

 
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Sounds like they are making some progress on the cap.

So, is the plan once a cap is on and flow has stopped, than you can hook to it and pump concrete back into it to plug it for good?

 
Sounds like they are making some progress on the cap.
So, is the plan once a cap is on and flow has stopped, than you can hook to it and pump concrete back into it to plug it for good?
I know less than zero about this.

But I suspect BP's plan, if possible , would be to figure out a way to suck oil out through the cap and sell it.

They might need the money to pay off the lawsuits.

 
I'm not sure if the "cap" obviates the need for the relief wells to truly kill the well. Probably not - you really need to be able to fill the well with mud from below. But, it's possible the cap may make it possible to force mud in at a high enough pressure to make it work from the wellhead. At any rate, the relief wells are almost complete, from what I understand, so my guess is they will go ahead and complete them.

The cap is working, though, and no more oil is escaping into the Gulf as of about 2.5 hours ago, so that's excellent news.

 
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