FPL cites 'engineer' as source of grid failure ...

[Guest]

As reported in the Miami News Herald, FPL blames engineer's error for blackout

Notable from the articles,

In a press release, the utility stated: ``A field engineer was diagnosing a switch that had malfunctioned at FPL's Flagami substation in West Miami. Without authorization, the engineer disabled two levels of relay protection. This was done contrary to FPL's standard procedures and established practices. Standard procedures do not permit the simultaneous removal of both levels of protection.

JR

 

[benbo]

As reported in the Miami News Herald, FPL blames engineer's error for blackout
Notable from the articles,

JR

First, I think most of the lights came back on in 4 hours, which isn't that bad.

Second, obviously, if this is true, this one engineer holds a large degree of blame. However, the thing that is so annoying with these big companies is that in their haste to pin it on someone they fail to do the proper root cause analysis to avert the problem in the future. Yes, I used to think RCA was a crock, but the truth is that there are always multiple root causes - human, physical, and latent, for failures. Knowing nothing about this, right off the bat, it seems odd to me that the fate of an entire regions electricity could be solely rested in the decisions of one engineer. And was he trained specifically in this procedure? Are there severe consequences for violating this procedure? Can you design it so no one engineer can have the permission to disable all the protection? Can you design in further backups (I understand nothing is perfect and cost is a factor)? I hope they really investigate this stuff. There is no way to completely eliminate chain of events that cause these things, but when something does happen the company should look on it as a prime opportunity to improve their processes so something more major doesn't ocur again.

 

[mudpuppy]

Can you design in further backups (I understand nothing is perfect and cost is a factor)?

There used to be further backups designed into the system, called Zone 3 relays. But NERC identified them as (arguably) a contributing factor to the last major blackout and, shortsightedly (in my opinion), significantly reduced their effectiveness. Since I haven't yet seen the data for this blackout I can't say that Zone 3 relays would have helped in this case, but it's possible.

I hope they really investigate this stuff.

It will be thouroughtly investigated; NERC has already requested that all records from the timeframe of this event be saved for the enitre Eastern Interconnection, which stretches from Florida to Canada and from the East Coast approximately to the Rockies (not sure how our records in MI are going to help the FL investigation, but ok). I'm sure NERC will be appointing a Task Force soon.

 

[Dark Knight]

I say this is :BS: !!!!!!!!!!

FPL loves to point fingers when something like that happens and usually the weakest link takes the blame. They say the engineer disabled two levels of protection without authorization. I say :BS: (redundancy alert....Relay Engineers love redundancy). FPL preaches safety and following procedures all the time. They have weekly meetings inside their respective groups and every single detail of jobs is discussed. Saying that the engineer did that without authorization can save FPL of a very rigurous investigation that who knows what will show. The engineer disabled two levels of protection without authorization...end of the story and everybody lived happy ever after. Easy way out. That is much easier to say than... our procedure for that kind of task is a piece of crap.

I am not saying it is impossible but I do not know a single relay engineer willing to take a chance like that without authorization, specially in f'ing Miami. They all know better than that. But they are the weakest link anyways, and expendable too.

 

[Wolverine]

I've got to question what "proper authorization" means? In my past life as a field engineer, I seem to remember being right-full-grown and expected to make my own decisions. I didn't call my supervisor to ask if I should open a link. A good manager imho puts the right people in the right job and then stands by them on the decisions they make, good or bad.

It's much easier to package it as a human error for presentation to the media. But then again human error is usually what sets things off - some momentary lapse of judgement that counfounds all preventative measures. I call it a triple-witching event: poor right-of-way maintenance, followed by equipment failure, coupled with a poorly engineered relay settings or poor system planning, and BINGO, it's lights out in NY City. The guy who's finger is on the button takes the blame, not the guy who was busy worrying about his girlfriend breaking up with him and didn't double check the torque on the switch coupling when it was installed, nor the executive who wanted to bump shareholder value by one tenth of a :2cents: by cutting O&M costs. But that's just the Ways of the Engineering Universe. At least they're protecting the guy by not releasing his name; otherwise they'd never get another engineer to work for them. :whipping:

Any engineer without a battlescar is lazy or a sleazeball.

 

[Flyer_PE]

Any engineer without a battlescar is lazy or a sleazeball.

I would add the option of incredibly lucky to that list. With some of the on-line adjustments I used to make at the power plant, it's a pure wonder that I never got the "A$$hole Of The Year Award" for tripping 1120MW of nuclear plant off line. The only large thing I wrecked was $10k worth of emergency diesel generator parts. I credit blind-*** luck for nothing else biting me.

 

[Dark Knight]

I was "responsible" of burning a 138kV SF6 Switch.

The investigation determined I was "innocent" because the semaphores of the switch were in such a bad shape( they were glazed and you could not see thru them) but I carried the seal of Dumb-*** for the rest of my time there.